Abstract
This study examines Lebanon’s Law on the Organization of the Judicial Court System, adopted by the Chamber of Deputies on July 31, 2025, and returned to the Chamber by the President of the Republic for further discussion, on September 5, 2025. It represents one of the most significant judicial reform initiatives since the Taif Agreement of 1989. The study traces the evolution of the Law’s provisions in successive drafts in light of the recommendations of the Venice Commission – the advisory body to the Council of Europe – and international standards regarding both institutional and individual judicial independence.
The article argues that the enacted Law introduced important reforms, enshrining the principle of judges’ irremovability, introducing partial elections within the High Judicial Council (HJC), abolishing the Minister of Justice’s authority over the Judicial Inspectorate and Judicial Studies Institute, and reinforcing judges’ individual freedoms. However, the study also notes that the text reflects setbacks, consolidating executive influence within the HJC by reducing the number of elected members and introducing co-option mechanisms that weaken elections by peers, and strengthens the hierarchical power of the Prosecutor General by granting it the authority to “discontinue prosecutions” in pending cases. Moreover, gaps persist in the evaluation and disciplinary systems, particularly regarding procedural guarantees.
In a nutshell, while the Law constitutes a meaningful step toward reform, it remains insufficient to ensure full judicial independence. Structural imbalances in the judiciary’s relationship with the executive and in the accountability framework persist, requiring further amendments to bring the enacted Law into closer conformity with international and European standards on judicial independence and accountability.
