Airs de famille entre le délire et la raison : Spinoza, Kant, Freud et Don Quichotte

Abstract

Although delirium appears to be opposed to reason, it adopts the appearance of reason by constructing its own logic. From a psychoanalytical point of view, delirium, which invents an alternative reality, is the result of a tension between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Paradoxically, psychoanalysis allows us to rethink madness precisely because it starts from a rationalist standpoint. Reason and madness are not always opposed, but rather function as a pair in which one adopts the traits of the other. Thus, for example, Don Quichotte’s delirium follows a certain logic, rooted in the subject’s pleasure principle. On the other hand, when reason does not respect the limits imposed by reality, it can enter into a delusional state. This is the interpretation proposed here concerning what Kant calls the Ideas of pure reason. We will discuss the intertwining of reason and delirium by drawing on Spinoza, Freud, Lacan, and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.